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Forthcoming in Reports of the National Center for Science Education
Review of The Cambridge Companion to Darwin
John S. Wilkins​[1]​
Hodge, M. J. S., and Gregory Radick. 2009. The Cambridge companion to Darwin. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. xiii, 548 p. Paperback: ISBN-13: 9780521777308, ISBN-10: 0521777305

As the sesquicentenary of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 2009 showed, there is an enormous amount of material one might have to become familiar with if one wants to make an informed decision on Darwin, and so a standard reference book is required. This is that book. The second edition of the volume, updated somewhat and with new essays. In conjunction with another volume on the Origin itself, most students of Darwin would have little need for any other introductions to the historical context and development of the theory of evolution.
Part I includes pieces by Phillip Sloan on how Darwin theorized evolution, Jon Hodge on the Notebooks and the years Darwin spent in London after the voyage of the Beagle, and essays on Darwin’s views on heredity (Jim Endersby), on mind and the emotions (Robert Richards) and the argument structure of the Origin (Ken Waters). All of these are excellent and nuanced, and well referenced, written by leading specialists on each topic. Endersby’s essay in particular introduced me to material I hadn’t previously encountered.
Part II looks at the historical, cultural and religious contexts, again by leading specialists. Gregory Radick asks an interesting question that concerns many: is the theory of natural selection tied into its cultural and political context? That is, does it rely on a “Victorian view of society?” He concludes that the origin of the notion of natural selection is inseparable from Malthusian and other contexts, but that this does not imply it is merely a social construct.
David Hull discusses the philosophical context of Herschel, Whewell and Mill, and situates Darwin as a Herschellian and Whewellian exponent of the idea of a vera causa, or “true cause” account of explanation in science, making their reticence to accept the arguments of the Origin interesting. He also considers how it is that Mill is popularly thought to have accepted the Origin, when in fact he hadn’t.
John Hedley Brooke, the doyen of Victorian religion and science studies, discusses both Darwin’s religious development from deist to agnostic (but unfortunately accepts the mistaken but prevailing view that his daughter Annie’s death contributed to his agnosticism), and the response of the religious to Darwin’s theories. It should surprise nobody that the response was mixed, but it may surprise some that overall, the churches did not object to the idea of evolution, nor even of selection. He concludes with a discussion of Darwin’s role (minimal) in the spread of secularism and skepticism.
Diane Paul discusses in a measured way an issue that has become more urgent now in the light of claims by anti-evolutionists that Darwin led to the Holocaust – whether or not Darwin was a social Darwinian. She observes that many of the founders of what came to be called “social Darwinism” were people Darwin cited extensively in Descent of Man, such as W. R. Greg and Darwin’s cousin Galton. Darwin, she concludes, wavered on the matter, and was overall not optimistic about the future of the European people. However, Paul notes that both socialists and capitalists found source material in Darwin’s work, and that most of what they are remembered for lacked any specifically Darwinian content. Eugenics owes most to Galton and subsequent genetics, and German militarism to the liberalism of the day, which was strongly authoritarian and nationalist.
A new essay for this edition by the editors discusses and dismisses John Dewey’s 1909 claim that Darwin overturned Greek essentialism. Instead, they show that Greek formalism was opposed by Greek atomism and Epicureanism, and that the tension between these two traditions persists and is largely unaffected by Darwin. However, while they rightly point out that Linnaean classification was not Aristotelian, in mentioning that he followed Aristotelian conventions in defining per genus et differentia, they imply, I believe wrongly, that Linnaeus thought classification was about definition rather than identification. Whewell’s reaction to the Origin is shown to be a case of treating it as Epicurean, which is the all-purpose heresy of the Christian west. I suspect Whewell was more right than he realized, and that this was a good thing; Epicurus gets bad press. The essay ends in a plea not to over simplify our historiography of the sciences and intellectual movements post-Origin.
Part III brings together a number of modern themes about Darwin in philosophy: the development of evolutionary theory from Darwin to today (Jean Gayon), metaphysics and epistemology (Elliot Sober), mind (Kim Sterelny), moral and social theory (Alex Rosenberg), and religious belief in modern society (Michael Ruse). Each of these is worth the price of the book alone, I think. Gayon’s essay on the meaning of “Darwinism”, the tree of life metaphor, the centrality of natural selection in Darwinian theory, group selection and self-organization, and macroevolutionary challenges to “Darwinism” is impossible to summarize. Sober’s is easier to do so, in part because he is himself summarizing ideas he has widely discussed for the past quarter century. He holds that “Darwinian theory” consists in two parts: the tree of life and natural selection, and that probability is a core aspect of the theory. He adopts the “essentialism story” that the editors deprecate in their essay above, unfortunately, but this is consistent with the view he has propounded for a very long time, as are his arguments in favor of likelihoodism against parsimony, and of optimality. The essay is a good summary of Sober’s ideas; if not as a general philosophical consensus of the modern evolutionary theories in play.
Kim Sterelny discusses the general role that Darwinian ideas play in modern philosophy of mind and cognition, which is appropriate given his contributions to that field. In the context of the tension between folk psychology and eliminativism, he notes that Darwin is an equivocal source, on the one hand promising an account of “intensionality”, how beliefs can be “about” the things they are about (through a process akin to selection, called “teleosemantics”), but on the other hand undercutting our folk psychological categories like the emotions and agency. These issues underpin (and to an extent undercut) the recent attack on Darwinian thinking by Jerry Fodor. He expands on these matters under the rubric of evolutionary psychology, and also the evolution of language.
Alex Rosenberg, a noted evolutionary naturalist, argues in favor of what he calls “Darwinian morality,” in which ethical judgments have their foundation in our biological and culturally evolved natures. In particular he discusses a “Darwinian meta-ethics” developed by Alan Gibbard, and argues that natural selection brought about norms of cooperation. He concludes with a discussion of the revival of group selectionist accounts by Edward O. Wilson and David Sloan Wilson, and of Brian Skyrms’ “stag hunt” model of cooperative behaviour as a replacement for Prisoner’s dilemma accounts, and what it all means for “hidden hand” accounts of social order.
Michael Ruse discusses various religion-specific issues, such as design, teleology, divine intervention in evolution, progress and providence, the problem of evil (which exercised Darwin himself no little bit), the existence of the soul, morality and freedom of the will, and divine mysteries, concluding that it is a hard thing, but possible, to be religious and a Darwinian. The essay is valuable both as a summary of Ruse’s own published arguments, and for its survey of the issues and subsequent taxonomy, whether you agree with Ruse or not.
Part IV is titled “Philosophical prospects”, which is possibly the most unifying label for the three following essays. Daniel Dennett asks where we are given that Darwin overturned the Cartesian tradition. I am uncertain that Darwin achieved this feat, myself, but given that the Cartesian tradition has been overturned, and Darwinian resources are used to do so, the topic remains salient. The abandonment of the centrality of design and intention in the natural order is a great problem for many, and Dennett is unapologetic about this. He give a précis of his arguments in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea in favor of a “design space” explored by trial and error processes, using a mythical play, Spamlet, which warms the heart of every Monty Python aficionado. It is Dennett at his best, accessible, deep and controversial.
Owen Flanagan considers the “manifest image of humankind”, taking a phrase from Wilfred Sellars. We were supposed to be a “little less than the angels”, made in the image of God. Now we find that we are animals, modified and unique, but animals nevertheless. What does this do to our self-image? Flanagan distinguishes between etiologies of ethics and moral value, and their justification, and considers ethics as a form of “human ecology”, in which values that contribute to human “flourishing” survive; this is, he notes, consistent with Aristotle’s ethics of the “political animal”, as well as Hume’s view of us as having “sympathy” for our fellows. He considers the recent work on emotions that derive from Darwin’s Expression of the Emotions, and a Strawsonian view of them as “reactive attitudes.” He closes with a section on the “Darwinian Good Life.”
Finally, in a new essay for this edition, Simon Blackburn investigates whether there even is such a thing as “human nature”, and whether the Hume-Darwin view survives. He discusses Fodor’s attack on Darwinian naturalism, in a timely manner, and how Darwinian Hume really is (or how Humean Darwin really is).
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